

# ONLINE APPENDIX

## A Dark Side of Cooperation: When International Organizations Spread Political Corruption

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## *Appendix A: List of Regional Organizations in the Data Set*

Appendix A includes a list of all regional organizations included in the COW IGO data set. We removed AfricaCare from the set of regional IOs since it is a nongovernmental organization. Further note that we only include those IOs in the calculations that were active at the time of observation. Data on regional organizations is from Jon Pevehouse.

1. Arab Auth. for Ag. Invest. & Development
2. Assoc. of African Central Banks
3. Assoc. of African Tax Administrators
4. Assoc. of Afr. Trade Promotion Orgs.
5. Arab Bank for Econ. Dev. in Africa
6. Arab Cooperation Council
7. Am Cmte Dependent Territories
8. Afr. Cultural Institute
9. Arab Center for Medical Lit.
10. Association of Caribbean States
11. African Civil Service Observatory
12. Administrative Center for Soc Security for Rhine Boatmen
13. Asian Clearing Union
14. Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development
15. Afr. Exp/Import Bank
16. Afr. Fund Guarantee & Econ. Coop.
17. African Postal Union
18. Afr. Foundation for R & D
19. Observatorie economique statistique sub-saharan Afr.
20. Association of Financial Supervisors of Pacific Countries
21. Arab Federation for Technical Educ.
22. African Groundnut Council
23. Arab Gulf Prog. for UN Dev. Org.
24. Arab Investment Company
25. Asian Industrial Development Council
26. Arab Industrial Devel. & Mining Org.
27. African Intellectual Property Organization
28. Arab Labor Organization
29. African Legal Support Facility
30. African & Malagasy Coffee Org.
31. African Ministers' Council on Water
32. Arab Monetary Fund
33. Afro-Malagasy Industrial Property Office
34. Afro-Malagasy Postal and Telecomm Union
35. African/Malagasy Sugar Council
36. Arab Maghreb Union
37. Arab Org for Ag. & Develop.
38. Afr. Org. of Cartography & Remote Sensing
39. Arab Org. for Mineral Resources
40. Asian-Oceanic Postal Union
41. Asian/Pacific Coconut Comm.
42. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
43. Asia-Pac Instit. for Broadcast Develop.
44. Asian Productivity Organization
45. African Petroleum Producers Association
46. Asia Pacific Telecommunity
47. African Postal and Telecom Union
48. Asian Reinsurance Corp.
49. Promotion of Nuc. Sci & Tech in L/A
50. Afr. Regional Intellectual Property Org.
51. Arab Postal Union
52. Afr. School of Architec. & Town Planning
53. Assoc. Superv. Banks of L/A & Caribb.
54. African Standing Conf. on Biblio. Control
55. Association of Southeast Asian Nations
56. Agency for the Safety of Air Navigation in Africa and Madagascar
57. Asia & Pacific Council
58. African Timber Org.
59. Africa Union
60. Afr. Oil Palm Dev. Assoc.
61. Africa Rice Center
62. Amazonian Coop. Council
63. Andean Community
64. Int'l Fund for Saving Aral Sea
65. Asian Dev. Bank
66. Baltic Batallion
67. Baltic Council
68. Benelux
69. Board of Nordic Dev. Projects
70. Bay of Bengal Programme Inter-Governmental Organization
- 71. Bonn Agreement**
72. Benelux Organization for Intellectual Property
73. Bank of the South
74. Black Sea Economic Council
75. Central Am. Coffee Board
76. Cent. American Energy Comm.
77. Central Asian Cooperation Organization
78. Centr. Am. Instit. for Public Admin.
79. Afr. & Malagasy Council for Higher Ed.
80. Conference for African Ministers for Sustainable Development
81. Central American Monetary Stability Fund
82. Caribbean Community
83. Caribbean Free Trade Area
84. Central American Research Institute for Industry
85. Congo Basin Forest Partnership


86. Council of Baltic Sea States
87. Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine
88. Cent. Compensation Off. of Maghreb
89. Caribbean Commission
90. Caribbean Development Bank
91. West African Economic Community
92. Central & Eastern Europe Privatization Network
93. Central Europe FTA
94. Central European Initiative
95. Central African Economic & Monetary Union
96. Economic Community of Great Lakes States
97. European Org for Nuclear Research
98. Caribbean Fin. Action Task Force
99. Conference Heads of State of Equ. Africa
100. Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia
101. Comm Intl Finan Cntrl Macedonia
102. Perm. Interstate Comm. for Drought Control in the Sahel
103. Inter-African Conference on Insurance Markets
104. Council of Min. Asian Econ. Coop.
105. Conference of Ministers of Agriculture of West and Central Africa
106. Council of Min. of Health of Arab Gulf States
107. Council of Europe
108. Common Market for East/South Africa
109. Conf. of Posts & Telecommunications of Central Africa
110. COSAVE
111. Central PanAm Bureau Eugenics
112. Caribbean Postal Union
113. Collective Security Treaty Organization
114. Caribb. Examinations Council
115. Caribbean Organization
116. Development Bank of Great Lake States
117. Desert Locust Control Org-East Af
118. Danube Commission
119. East African Community
120. East African Common Market
121. East African Common Services Org
122. East African Development Bank
123. European Central Bank
124. Eastern Caribb. Central Bank
125. Economic Community of Central African States
126. Eastern Caribb. Central Bank
127. Euro Comm for Control of Danube
128. East Caribbean Common Market
129. Euro Company Chem Process Irrad Fuels
130. Economic Cooperation Organization
131. Economic Community of West African States
132. Euro Conf Postal Telecom Admin
133. European Coal & Steel Community
134. European Economic Community
135. Euro Food Code Council
136. Eur. Foundation for Impr. of Living & Work Conditions
137. Euro Free Trade Assn
138. Euro Investment Bank
139. European Institute of Peace
140. Europ. Institute of Public Admin.
141. Euro Space Vehicle Launcher Dev Org
142. European Molecular Biology Conference
143. Eur. Molecular Biol. Lab
144. European Monetary Institute
145. Euro Productivity Agency
146. Euro. Postal Financial Services Comm.
147. European Patent Organization
148. European Payments Union
149. Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia
150. European Space Agency
151. European Southern Observatory
152. Euro Space Research Org
153. European Training Foundation
154. European Union
155. Euro Comm for Control Foot-Mouth Disease
156. European Association of National Metrology Institute
157. European Atomic Energy Agency
158. Euro Org Safety Air Navig
159. Euro Comp for Finance Railway Rolling Stock
160. European Collaboration on Measurement Standards
161. Entente Council
162. Fund 4 Devel. of Indigen Peoples of LA/Carib
163. Group of 3
164. Group on Balkan Agreem. on Coop. on Tourism
165. Gulf Cooperation Council
166. Guidance Comm. for Road Safety in Nordic Cntry
167. Group of L/A & Carib. Sugar Exp. Countries
168. Gulf Org. for Industrial Consulting
169. Intl Assoc for Public Baths
170. Inter-Am Coffee Board
171. Inter-Am Children's Instite
172. Inter-Af Cmte Stat
173. Inter-Am Conf on Social Security
174. Inter Am Comm Women
175. Inter-American Development Bank

176. Inter-American Defense Board
177. Inter-Am Fed of Cotton
178. Inter American High Commission
179. Inter American Institute for Agricultural Sciences
180. Inter-American Investment Corporation
181. Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corp.
182. Inter-American Indian Insitit
183. Intl Advisory Cmte Long Distance Tele
184. Intl Af Migratory Locust Org
185. Inter-Af Phyto Convention
186. Inter-American Radio Office
187. Inter Am Trdmk Bureau
188. Intl Arbitration Trib at San Jose
189. Inter-Am Tropical Tuna Comm
190. Int Comm for Protection of Moselle
191. Intl Central American Office
192. Intl Comm of Cape Spartel Light
193. Int'l Comm. for the Hydrology of the Rhine Basin
194. Intl Comm Navigation of Congo
195. Int Comm Protect Rhine Pollution
196. Intl Conf Promoting Tech Unification
197. Intergov. Committee of the River Plate Basin
198. Intl Comm for the Oder
199. Intl Elbe Comm
200. Inter-Gov Authority on Drought Protection
201. International Institute for Water and Environment Engineering
202. Intl Moselle Comp
203. Instit Nutrition for Cent Am & Pan
204. InfoFish
205. InfoSAMAK
206. Inter-St Org. for Advanced Technicians of Hydraulics...
207. Intl Patent Institute
208. Int'l Pedological Instit
209. Intl Physiological Lab
210. Interstate Bank
211. Inter-State School for Hydraulic & Rural Engin...
212. International Sava River Basin Commission
213. International Tripartite Rubber Organization, Thailand
214. Intgyt TV & Radio Corp
215. Intl Union of Pruth
216. Joint Anti-Locust & Anti-Aviarian Org.
217. Joint Nordic Org. Lappish Culture & Reindeer
218. L/A Civil Aviation Comm.
219. Latin Am Center for Physics
220. Latin American Energy Org.
221. L/A Fisheries Devel. Org.
222. Latin American Free Trade Area
223. Latin Am Integration Assn
224. Latin American Institute of Educational Communication
225. Lake Chad Basin Comm
226. Liptako-Gourma Integrated Dev. Auth.
227. League of Arab States
228. Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre - Narcotics
229. Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative
230. Multi-Country Posts & Telecomm. Training Center
231. Ministerial Conference of West & Central African States on Maritime (Maritime Organisation for West and Central Africa (MOWCA))
232. Mano River Union
233. Mercosur
234. Network of Aquaculture Centers in Asia-Pac
235. North American Free Trade Agreement
236. N. Am. Plant Protection Org.
237. Nordic Council of Ministers
238. Nordic Council for Reindeer Research
239. Nordic Council for Tax Research
240. Nordic Development Fund
241. North American Electric Reliability Corporation
242. Nordic Investment Bank
243. Nordic Patent Institute
244. Niger River Community
245. Nordic Telecommunication Satellite Council
246. Nordic Centre for Welfare and Social Issues
247. Nordic World Heritage Foundation
248. Nordic Council
249. Org. Arab Petroleum Export. Countries
250. Pan-Am Union/Org of Am States
251. Org for African Unity
252. Common Afro-Malagasy Economic Org
253. Org. Central Am. States
254. Org. of Coord. for Control of Endemic Diseases in Cent. Afr.
255. Org. Eastern Caribbean States
256. Org for European Economic Coop
257. Org. Management & Dev. of Kaegara River
258. Gambia River Basin Dev. Org.
259. Agency for Prohib. of Nuclear Arms in Latin Am.
260. Oslo Commission
261. OSPAR Commission
262. Perm Assoc PanAm Highway Congresses
263. Pan-Am Health Org
264. Pan Am Instit of Geog & Hist
265. Pan-African Parliament
266. Pan African Postal Union
267. Paris Commission
268. Perm Comm for Conserv Maritime South Pacific

269. Pole European de Development  
 270. Pacific Island Forum  
 271. Port Management Assoc. of E. and S. Africa  
 272. Perm. Sec. of the S. Am. Agr. on Narcotic  
 Drugs  
 273. Pref Trade Area: S & E Africa  
 274. Reg. Afr. Satellite Comm. Org.  
 275. Reg. Council for Adult Educ. & Literacy in  
 Africa  
 276. Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light  
 Weapons  
 277. International Regional Organization against  
 Plant & Animal Disease  
 278. Rio Group  
 279. Special Arab Aid Fund for Africa  
 280. South Asian Assoc Regional Coop  
 281. S. Asia Coop. Environment Prog.  
 282. Southern African Customs Union  
 283. Southern African Dev. Community  
 284. Southern African Dev. Coordination Conf.  
 285. Societe arabe des mines de l'Inchiri  
 286. South African Regional Tourism Council  
 287. Suez Canal Administration  
 288. Scientific Council in SSA  
 289. Group of Schengen  
 290. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation  
 291. Southeast Asian Minist. of Educ. Org.  
 292. Latin American Economic System  
 293. Central American Integration System  
 294. General Treaty on Central American  
 Economic Integration\Secretariat for the  
 Central American Economic Integration  
 295. South Pacific Comm  
 296. Senegal River Dev. Org.  
 297. South & West Asia Postal Union  
 298. Southwest Pacific Dialogue  
 299. Joint Admin. of Turkish Culture & Arts  
 300. United Arab Shipping Co.  
 301. Union of Banana Exporting Countries  
 302. Central African Customs & Economic  
 Union  
 303. West African Economic & Monetary Union  
 304. Union for International Use of Carriages &  
 Vans  
 305. Central African Monetary Union  
 306. West African Monetary Union  
 307. Univ. of South Pacific  
 308. Vision & Strategies Around Baltic Sea  
 309. West Afr. Examinations Council  
 310. West African Health Community  
 311. West African Health Organization  
 312. Working Community of Danube Countries  
 313. Western European Union  
 314. West Nordic Fund  
 315. Warsaw Treaty Org

*Appendix B: Average IO Corruption of Poland*

This appendix provides another descriptive graph to illustrate historical developments of *Average IO Corruption* for individual countries. Poland sought membership in a number of more corrupt IOs—such as the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Central European Initiative (CEI), and the Central European Trade Association (CEFTA)—after its independence at the end of the Cold War. Figure B.1 indicates that the country’s *Average IO Corruption*—its participation in a network of highly corrupted IOs—is also followed by a worsening in Poland’s national *Corruption* scores, although the worsening is more delayed than in the Thai case. This worsening trend is only temporary: the country also experienced a small improvement in national *Corruption* (i.e., scores declined), which coincided with a decline in its *Average IO Corruption* scores during the 1990s. After its accession to the EU in 2004, we observe only a very slight improvement in Poland’s *Corruption* score, without a more sustainable improvement. This is interesting given the common notion that EU membership should have improved Poland’s good governance more steadily.




*Figure B.1: Average IO Corruption and National Corruption of Poland*

*Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics*

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Corruption (ICRG)	-3.048406	1.325592	-6	0
Avg IO Corruption	-67.42174	27.78919	-163.8273	-26.39724
Avg IO Corruption (Not Weighted)	-2.538421	.881858	-5.261229	-.8074813
Democracy	2.233298	7.069598	-10	10
PC GDP (log)	8.459575	1.276875	5.091393	11.49428
PC GDP Growth (%)	1.91846	5.903578	-30.25499	58.00999
Trade Openness	.4426865	1.406337	-.0032219	19.11726
Regime Durability	25.73312	30.20132	0	196
Diffusion	-3.018933	.9869892	-6	-.3055556
N	948			

*Appendix D: Avg IO Corruption and Anti-Corruption Mandates*

This appendix presents box plots for the variable *Avg IO Corruption*. The left-side plot represents IOs without mandates, while the right-side plot represents organizations with anti-corruption mandates.






*Appendix E: Avg IO Corruption and National Corruption – Interaction with Rule of Law and Judicial Independence*

	(1) Rule of Law	(2) Judicial Independence
Avg IO Corruption	0.059** (0.016)	0.046** (0.008)
Rule of Law	-0.982** (0.321)	
Interaction	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.029** (0.010)
Democracy	-0.002 (0.014)	0.006 (0.022)
PC GDP (log)	0.118 (0.221)	0.011 (0.216)
PC GDP Growth (%)	0.005 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.004)
Trade Openness	0.058 (0.051)	0.010 (0.020)
Regime Durability	0.008 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.006)
Diffusion	0.017 (0.113)	0.246** (0.087)
Time Trend	0.089* (0.045)	0.037 (0.025)
Judicial Independence		-3.594** (1.059)
Constant	-0.050 (2.033)	1.241 (1.772)
F-Test	16.621**	23.514**
R2	0.456	0.361
Observations	493	948

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05



*Figure: The Effect of Avg IO Corruption for Different Levels of Domestic "Judicial Independence"*

### *Appendix F: Avg IO Corruption and Corruption - Other Control Variables*

To further check the robustness of our main findings, we now include different sets of additional control variables. First, we add a number of additional political control variables to the model that have been used in other empirical models of corruption (Model 1). Specifically, we control for the number of IO memberships a country has, inter- and intrastate conflict (data from the COW Intra-State and Inter State War Data sets), the amount of FDI inflows to a country as a share of that country's GDP (data are from UNCTAD), whether the country is a presidential system, the government's vote share, the mean district magnitude (log), and the percentage of Protestants. Data for political variables are from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001), while data for Protestants are from the World Religion Project. Second, we substitute our average *Avg IO Corruption* measure with a *Maximum IO Corruption* measure, under the logic that participation in even one highly member-corrupted IO—rather than the average across all memberships—could produce this effect (Model 2). This measure uses the highest corruption score of the IOs that a country is a member of. Third, we substitute our Polity measure for *Democracy* measure with data by Freedom House (Model 3). Forth, we exclude the measure for *Diffusion* to test whether the high correlation between *Diffusion* and *Avg IO Corruption* may affect the main results (Model 4). Finally, in Model 4 we use a different measure of diffusion. In particular, we add an explanatory variable measuring the average level of corruption in the country's home region, as defined by the Polity IV project. Our main findings are robust across all these specifications. Corruption appears to spread through IOs among members.

	(1) Controls	(2) Max	(3) Freedom House	(4) No Diffusion	(5) Regional Diffusion
Avg IO Corruption	0.030*** (0.009)	0.019*** (0.003)	0.029*** (0.005)	0.034*** (0.005)	0.037*** (0.005)
Democracy	-0.013 (0.022)	-0.034** (0.014)	0.062 (0.045)	-0.023* (0.013)	-0.021 (0.013)
PC GDP (log)	0.296 (0.251)	-0.034 (0.219)	-0.098 (0.211)	-0.140 (0.211)	-0.116 (0.217)
PC GDP Growth (%)	-0.006 (0.008)	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
Trade Openness	0.007 (0.026)	0.011 (0.016)	0.018 (0.017)	0.003 (0.021)	0.004 (0.021)
Regime Durability	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)
Presidential System	0.613*** (0.176)	0.553*** (0.171)	0.535*** (0.179)	0.506** (0.202)	0.509** (0.203)
Diffusion	0.172* (0.096)	0.275*** (0.076)	0.252*** (0.082)		-0.191 (0.119)
Time Trend	0.022 (0.047)	0.046* (0.024)	0.019 (0.022)	0.050** (0.025)	0.057** (0.024)
FDI Inflows (% GDP)	-0.714 (1.423)				
IO Memberships	0.014 (0.025)				
Interstate Conflict	-0.266 (0.184)				
Intrastate Conflict	0.293** (0.134)				
Government Vote (%)	0.003 (0.002)				
Mean District Magnitude	-0.000 (0.000)				
Protestant (%)	0.000 (0.000)				
Constant	-3.791 (2.345)	-0.433 (1.797)	-0.026 (1.771)	-0.030 (1.675)	-0.458 (1.763)
Observations	387	945	951	1090	1090

Standard errors in parentheses  
\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

*Appendix G: Avg IO Corruption and Corruption – Other Corruption Measures*

We now demonstrate that the findings are robust to using different measures of corruption. Model 1 uses the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WGI) control of corruption score, which captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, as well as capture of the state by elites and private interests (Kaufman et al. 2010). Model 2 uses Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) score, which measures the perceived level of public sector corruption in a country in a given year. The WGI is available from 1996-2002 (every two years) and then annually until 2013. CPI is available from 1995-2013. Since the methodology for the CPI index changed significantly in 2012, we only include data until 2011. We use the inverse of both indicators (averaged over three-year periods) such that larger values on each variable indicate more corruption. Model 3 uses the World Bank Enterprise Survey’s data on bribery incidence, which measures the percentage of firms experiencing at least one bribe payment request. The Bribery Incidence data is available from 2006-2013, with different country coverage each year. Since data availability over time is much lower, we estimate the model without fixed effects, with robust standard errors. Since the dependent variable *Bribery (Incidence)* is not normally distributed, we use its natural log. Note, that the inclusion of *Diffusion* leads to a large loss of information in the Model 3. In Model 4, we estimate the *Bribery* model, but exclude *Diffusion* to make sure the results are not driven by this loss of data.

In all models, *Avg IO Corruption* is estimated in the way described in the research design above using these different underlying data, which cover slightly different countries and time periods. The results indicate positive and significant effects for all five specifications. An increase of a country’s *Avg IO Corruption* in a corrupt IO network leads to an increase in the perception of domestic *Corruption* no matter which index is used.

	(1) WGI	(2) CPI	(3) Bribery I	(4) Bribery II
Avg IO Corruption	0.005** (0.002)	0.002* (0.001)	0.017* (0.009)	0.007*** (0.001)
Democracy	-0.018** (0.008)	-0.005 (0.012)	-0.041 (0.034)	-0.036** (0.016)
PC GDP (log)	-0.158 (0.099)	-0.329 (0.295)	0.025 (0.230)	-0.126* (0.064)
PC GDP Growth (%)	0.000 (0.002)	0.005 (0.008)	-0.019 (0.012)	-0.014 (0.011)
Trade Openness	-0.000 (0.025)	-0.017 (0.024)	-0.036 (0.159)	0.018 (0.081)
Regime Durability	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.018* (0.010)	-0.008 (0.007)
Presidential System	-0.021 (0.196)	-0.208 (0.128)	0.311 (0.387)	0.074 (0.168)
Diffusion	-0.037 (0.037)	-0.113 (0.101)	-0.119 (0.436)	

Time Trend	0.078***	0.100**		
	(0.027)	(0.048)		
Constant	-0.877	-1.895	1.177	3.399***
	(0.838)	(2.488)	(1.752)	(0.579)
Observations	601	457	33	98

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

*Appendix H: Avg IO Corruption and Corruption – Other Good Governance Measures*

Whereas our theoretical focus is on the spread of corruption, one could argue that IOs may have effects on other indicators of good governance as well. Here, we analyze whether our statistical results transfer to other indicators of good governance. In Model 1, we rely on the World Bank’s WGI indicator of Voice and Accountability to capture perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. Model 2 relies on their indicator of the Rule of Law to gauge perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Regulatory Quality (Model 3) captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Government Effectiveness (Model 4) captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. For all indicators, we calculated the relevant *Avg IO Corruption* scores, such that for example the level of regulatory quality in a country is affected by the *Avg IO Corruption* of that country in regional organizations with different average levels of regulatory quality. The results show that our findings on the diffusion of corruption carry over to some other governance indicators (with the exception of the Rule of Law and the Government Effectiveness indicators).

	(1) Voice and Accountability	(2) Rule of Law	(3) Regulatory Quality	(4) Government Effectiveness
Avg IO Governance	0.004*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)
Democracy	-0.065*** (0.008)	-0.030*** (0.008)	-0.019** (0.008)	-0.019*** (0.007)
PC GDP (log)	-0.042 (0.065)	-0.095 (0.088)	-0.245*** (0.084)	-0.048 (0.079)
PC GDP Growth (%)	0.002 (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Trade Openness	0.006 (0.012)	0.012 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.013 (0.014)
Regime Durability	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.010*** (0.003)
Diffusion	0.017 (0.032)	0.048 (0.042)	-0.021 (0.033)	-0.002 (0.033)
Time Trend	0.064*** (0.020)	0.018 (0.022)	0.068*** (0.024)	0.035 (0.022)
Constant	-1.612*** (0.531)	-1.348* (0.749)	-0.706 (0.660)	-1.808*** (0.637)
Observations	611	611	610	610

Standard errors in parentheses  
\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

*Appendix I: Avg IO Corruption and Corruption – Different IO Types*

Here, we analyze the effect of *Avg IO Corruption* for different types of international organizations, as perhaps corruption is more likely to occur and spread through certain types of organizations. Model 1 includes a measure of *Avg IO Corruption* that is based on the entire sample of international organizations (including universal and cross-regional organizations). Model 2 generates *Avg IO Corruption* using only the sample of regional organizations that mainly focus on economic issues, such as trade and finance. Model 3 restricts the sample to regional organizations that focus on political issues, and Model 5 restricts the sample to regional organizations that focus on social issues. The effect of *Avg IO Corruption* is consistently positive and significant across all those specifications.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	All IOs	Economic	Political	Social
Avg IO Corruption	0.049*** (0.008)	0.021*** (0.006)	0.018*** (0.006)	0.017*** (0.005)
Democracy	-0.029** (0.014)	-0.035** (0.016)	-0.038** (0.015)	-0.037** (0.015)
PC GDP (log)	-0.063 (0.211)	-0.049 (0.211)	0.108 (0.175)	0.036 (0.182)
PC GDP Growth (%)	0.001 (0.004)	0.000 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)
Trade Openness	0.015 (0.018)	0.019 (0.019)	0.012 (0.017)	0.013 (0.019)
Regime Durability	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.007)
Diffusion	0.213*** (0.076)	0.308*** (0.083)	0.290*** (0.077)	0.299*** (0.081)
Time Trend	-0.012 (0.030)	0.054** (0.026)	0.053** (0.024)	0.053** (0.024)
Constant	1.581 (1.826)	-0.328 (1.784)	-1.864 (1.494)	-1.269 (1.564)
Observations	951.000	938.000	935.000	886.000

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01



*Appendix J: Avg IO Corruption and Corruption - Model Specification*

We now analyze the robustness of our results to changes in the model specification. Model 1 adds a lagged dependent variable. Model 2 estimates a random effects model and Model 3 uses a between-effects estimator. Model 4 includes country and period fixed effects, and Model 5 includes region and period fixed effects. The results are robust to these alternative model specifications.

	(1) LDV	(2) RE	(3) BE	(4) Period FE	(5) Region FE
LDV	0.506*** (0.032)				
Avg IO Corruption	0.018*** (0.004)	0.021*** (0.004)	0.013** (0.005)	0.022*** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.005)
Democracy	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.028*** (0.010)	-0.027** (0.013)	-0.029* (0.015)	-0.029*** (0.011)
PC GDP (log)	-0.065 (0.129)	-0.045 (0.074)	-0.175** (0.073)	-0.041 (0.220)	-0.187* (0.104)
PC GDP Growth (%)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.000 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.026)	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
Trade Openness	0.008 (0.012)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.027 (0.056)	0.014 (0.020)	0.003 (0.017)
Regime Durability	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.007*** (0.003)	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.007** (0.003)
Diffusion	0.149*** (0.053)	0.257*** (0.075)	0.202 (0.122)	0.203** (0.091)	0.216** (0.085)
Time Trend	0.038** (0.017)	0.061*** (0.022)	0.206** (0.085)		0.063*** (0.023)
Constant	0.605 (1.085)	-0.527 (0.497)	-0.728 (0.629)	-0.519 (1.870)	0.981 (0.978)
Country FE	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Region FE	No	No	No	No	Yes
Period FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Between-Effects	No	No	Yes	No	No
Observations	823	948	948	948	816

Standard errors in parentheses  
\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

*Appendix K: Avg IO Corruption and Corruption – Time Periods*

Models 1 and 2 estimate our main model using annual data. Since we would not expect an immediate effect of *Avg IO Corruption* on national corruption, we lag *Avg IO Corruption* by one year (Model 1) and two years (Model 2). Model 3 estimates our main model using five-year period data, and Model 4 analyzes a single cross section. Our main findings are robust to these alterations.

	(1) Annual (t-1)	(2) Annual (t-2)	(3) 5-year periods	(4) Cross-Section
Avg IO Corruption	0.006** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	0.026** (0.007)	0.021** (0.005)
Democracy	-0.037** (0.013)	-0.038** (0.013)	-0.013 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.012)
PC GDP (log)	0.040 (0.190)	0.052 (0.191)	0.097 (0.248)	-0.109 (0.069)
PC GDP Growth (%)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.027)
Trade Openness	0.007 (0.016)	0.007 (0.016)	0.029* (0.016)	-0.050 (0.053)
Regime Durability	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.010** (0.002)
Diffusion	0.354** (0.058)	0.366** (0.059)	0.309** (0.092)	0.105 (0.102)
Time Trend	0.035** (0.007)	0.039** (0.008)	0.052 (0.052)	
Constant	-72.504** (14.179)	-79.065** (14.390)	-1.252 (2.039)	-0.011 (0.434)
Observations	2708	2704	484	128

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05